Preface: Italian Theory and Origin
In the last decade or so, a wave of Italian thinkers has broken ground for new theoretical inquiries that poignantly interpret the turn to life that characterizes present philosophical research. The distinguishing trait of what has been called "contemporary Italian thought," "Italian critical theory," or "Italian difference" is in fact a sustained effort to think through the complex issue of life from the point of view of political praxis. 1 Of the various interpretations that have been attempted, perhaps the philosopher who has drawn out this definition most comprehensively is Roberto Esposito. I am referring in particular to his book Living Thought: The Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy (2010) , in which he argues that the lack of a national anchoring is precisely what distinguishes this philosophy, as Italy's political history "came into being under conditions of political decentralization and fragmentation." 2 This difference impressed a peculiar direction to the research so that Esposito writes, "while modern philosophical culture, in its various expressions, identifies itself in a gesture of rupture with what comes before it, Italian thought not only has never severed this tie, it seeks the form and sense of its own actuality by looking to the origin." 3 Origin here stands out as something external that complicates theory and simultaneously makes it more apt to intervene in the shifting grounds of contemporary society. More specifically, "by projecting the archaic onto the heart of the present [l'attuale] , or by exposing the present to the archaic, these categories diagonally connect knowledge and power, nature and history, technology and life." 4 Furthermore, Italian philosophy can claim a vantage point in this sense, because it articulates a reflection on the creative force that characterizes the beginning and that seems to never degenerate into a reactionary posturing. As Esposito writes: "Without ever turning inward in a conservative attitude, and indeed projecting itself beyond the threshold of modernity, all Italian thought, from Bruno to Leopardi, seeks in the wisdom of the ancients the keys to interpret what is closest at hand . . . the actuality of the originary." 5
While affirming the centrality of origin in Italian philosophies is certainly productive, as is, for that matter, drawing attention to various Italian authors who should be rediscovered or further studied in these terms, I am wary of such a value judgment, especially when it concerns more recent cultural productions. I would say rather that precisely because of the insistence on this particular topic within Italian culture we could find a wide range of approaches from the far left to the far right. My contention in this book is that there is in fact at least one case in which the drifting toward the reactionary pole has occurred: it is a section of fascism usually identified with the Strapaese (hyper-country) movement that heralded the idea of the fascist as the new savage and of an antisystemic full-fledged vitalism at the service of the dictatorship. And this is not so much the case of an unexpected anomaly but rather an advanced point of experimentation that although not hegemonic during the regime, may instead be very instructive for understanding how capitalism works, namely, the ways in which a perhaps still elementary administering of the body announces more sophisticated forms of molar organization of power. In the rebellious, nomadic attitude toward life fabricated through the idea of the savage, these intellectuals built the rudiments of a technology that puts subversive and untamed energies at the service of stability.
How else are we to explain the more subtle forms of control that organize present society? One only needs to think about the last two decades of Italian history: the hyper-hedonist option of Silvio Berlusconi, the various neoliberal governments of the center-left, and finally the recent, technocratic European Union austerity-led governments (from Mario Monti to Matteo Renzi), along with the latecomer of Italian politics: the postideological, Internet-based opposition of stand-up comedian Beppe Grillo and his Five Star Movement. The spectrum of Italian politics is dominated by a cohesion that goes deeper than the simple alternation of names. This homogeneity is the result of the advanced degree of experimentation carried out in the Italian political laboratory, where the "transformation of the classic paradigm of sovereignty into that of biopolitical governmentality takes place . . . through the collapse of the normative role of the law and a merely tactical use of it." 6 The aims and scopes of these tactics may vary: from the call to transgression of Berlusconism, to the austerity of technocrats that obey the European Union Troika, to the apocalyptic elimination of all parties hailed by the Five Star Movement or the decisionism of Renzismo, they all embody some kind of destructuring tendency that having surpassed the verticality of power of industrial democracy, now points to a molecular form of control arranged in a horizontal, dispersive configuration, one that functions not so much through negations but through the fabrication of sites of affirmation. 7 Here we come to the reason for the priority of origin in recent Italian thought. Antonio Negri once said that the best production of Italian philosophy was born at the margin of repression, and this is certainly true for us today. The form of oppression that inspires this new fascistoid order is one that reflects mechanisms of extraction of value typical of what Marx called ursprüngliche Akkumulation, primitive or originary accumulation. Only today can we fully understand how modern is the antimodern stance embodied by this kind of regime. Because today's immaterial work-that is to say, the biopolitics enacted by neoliberal capitalism-organizes production precisely around the subsumption of life itself. The recrudescence of the archaic in today's hyper-technological present relies on the exploitation of the animal-biological dimension of the "new factories of cultural production" and of production in general through the circuits of financial economy. 8 Referring back to John Maynard Keynes, who talked about the animal spirits of capitalism, Matteo Pasquinelli explains how in contemporary society "the animal body is the productive engine of the multitudes finally described in all its variants: cognitive, affective, libidinal and physical. It is a way to combine surplus production, social conflicts, libidinal excess and political passions along a single terrain." 9 It is our contemporary, specific conjuncture that allows us to disclose the meaning of the anachronistic in modernity. Hence the methodology that this book attempts is one that tries to bring together two areas of thought that had traditionally developed separately: biopolitics and psychoanalysis. Because it is precisely "the intersection of Foucauldian and Lacanian analytical tools" that now as in the past, "provides an effective understanding of contemporary populisms and of their capability to intervene upon and impact not only the bios, but also and crucially the individual and social psyche." 10 More specifically, as the key word here for us is origin, we need to tie together that line of inquiry that articulated the concept of biopolitics with the development of psychoanalysis elaborated by the thought of sexual difference. On one side, we have the genealogical tradition inaugurated by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche that flourished in Michel Foucault. This focus was brought to bear on a correct analysis of the reproduction of social relations by Italian workerist and postworkerist inquiry in the tradition of biopolitics. On the other, Sigmund Freud's work morphed into a Lacanian and post-Lacanian feminist critique that provides other building blocks for this genealogy. These two fields of study have rarely marched together; nevertheless, the goal of this book is to show how they mutually reinforce one another when laying out an analytic of the processes of subjectivation. This Janus-headed analysis finds the locus for its application precisely in the issue of origin as an engendering, originating structure. The latter constitutes subjectivities as continuously external to themselves. The temporal characteristic of this element should not go unnoticed, for the notion of the archaic in its proper Greek meaning of arché is, precisely, origin. Our relation with the past is never completed. Following Marx's concept of ursprüngliche Akkumulation, the archaic is not defined by a fixed chronological limit. It is not a point in time that ceased to exist. Finally, it is not even an obscure object, a dormant thing that can be simply reactivated. It is nonlatent; it is immanent to life as that structure that just like the unconscious never stops writing itself. Paradoxically, in this research it is precisely the archaic that stands out as the ultramodern culmination of our modernity.
Modernity, the Male, and the Whole In his first lecture dedicated to jouissance in his seminars of 1972-1973, Jacques Lacan discusses the problem of infinity, making reference to the famous case of Zeno's paradox. He argues that "what Zeno does not see is that the tortoise does not escape the destiny that weighs upon Achillesits step too gets shorter and shorter and it never arrives at the limit either. It is on that basis that a number, any number whatsoever, can be defined, if it is real. A number has a limit and it is to that extent that it is infinite." 11 Georg Cantor's set theory is based precisely on this fundamental contradiction: that it is the limit that produces the infinite. To put it simply, the whole as a set is unrepresentable to itself from the outside, from a margin of non-itself, and opens itself to a porosity that disintegrates any kind of secure foundation. Here we register a shift from an idea of the whole as a territory in which the openness of the system, its limitless ground to be annexed, leans out toward the outside-and can thus be potentially incorporated-to that of a porous field in which, as it were, infinity looks back inwardly and appears to be always in excess of itself.
If we substitute the term whole with that of life, as Foucault did in his work The Order of Things (1966), we begin to grasp how the problem of incommensurability defines modernity. According to Foucault, modernity is inaugurated by a very premodern shift, what he calls an "untamed ontology"-that is to say, the idea that "the field of knowledge is no longer split between existing and non-existing things, divided by the border between being and non-being," but by a notion of perennial life based on the singular deaths of species' individuals that saturate the field. 12 Now split apart, the field of life generates a groundless dimension in which human activities must be conceived of as purely autonomous. And here we should transcend the positive nuance of the term autonomy by also understanding its traumatic nature; for if autonomy means self-positing, it also implies the absolutely arbitrary, conventional, and thus unguaranteed nature of its practices. This transformation, one that Georg Lukács in his work The Destruction of Reason (1962) identifies as a point of acute crisis for Western culture that produces irrationalist and vitalist philosophies, has far reaching consequences for the literature under scrutiny in this book. 13 Yet, as argued by Lacan, incommensurability is not just a scientific, geographical, or political issue, for it is in fact structurally homologous to the question of sexual difference, namely, to the ways in which individual subjects take position with regard to the world in what he calls the logic of sexuation. The tortoise, for Lacan, stands for Briseis: the Trojan slave who Achilles wants to possess, but to no avail, and who, as Homer tells us, drives Achilles mad. Building on this geometric aporia, Lacan discusses two types of jouissance, one that is masculine and based on a logic that "is marked by the hole that leaves it no other path than that of phallic jouissance" and another that develops on the terrain of the nonwhole: that of an inconsistent field. 14 In other words, as Ellie Ragland summarizes, the "masculine position is based on a fantasy of essentialization of the woman . . . such that some myth of the whole, essential, primordial mother continues to serve the male, unconsciously, as a guarantee to a stable, logical dependable universe." 15 On the other hand, the feminine figure "approaches her jouissance as a supplemental doubling due to her not being all under the phallic sway"; strictly speaking, "(s)he is not all identified with an abstract principle for law, language and reality." 16 I am sympathetic with the rhetorical question that Kiarina Kordela poses in this regard: "Is modernism, and even more so postmodernism, the era that has to return directly to the 'original problem,' the 'initial opposition' of sexual difference, rather than replacing it with some other more amenable pair of terms?" 17 Modernity is the point in which an epistemological closed system (patriarchy) begins to falter-and this crisis is not a metaphysical occurrence but the result of a series of multidirectional struggles carried out by subaltern entities to which capitalism responded with further reconfigurations of its socioeconomic order. The neoliberal age is the time when crisis is further radicalized and used as a form of power; hence, the problem of origin emerges in all its might. Diana Sartori explains the conundrum of our neoarchaic phase in these terms: "With the end of patriarchy also comes the end of its order, but the result is not the immediate establishment of a new order, but rather an increase in disorder, and the return of forms of conceptualization, regulation, action and emotion that are more archaic, increasingly often elementary and violent." 18 The deconstituent processes that animate the neoliberal order hold the key for understanding our apparent chronological incongruence: how ultramodern points of social experimentation follow patterns that are ostensibly archaic. This is why-and this is the other big question that this work addresses-fascism claimed to be revolutionary in its own fashion. The authors I examine engaged with and responded to the most advanced problem of modernity, which is that of the inconsistency of the field of life. The untamed dimension of this topology is what fascism understands very clearly. Its incorporation of life over the living beings is the truth that it announces. Obviously, it is a kind of thought that neutralizes the question of sexual difference. In these authors we see an attempt to deconstruct the Oedipal solution, for however conservative in its real politics and theories, the fascism of the Tuscan savage breaks boundaries and norms only to better intensify the exploitation of the libidinal. Halfway between the masculine failing of reason and something else, a more potentially liberating route, this kind of fascism hits on a conservative subversivism-that is to say, precisely a way to preserve and exploit the circulatory capacity of libido. Openness is not bluntly denied and fenced off; the conventional bourgeois mentality is not what drives this approach to the infinite. The fascist gladly descends into the wild meadows of the flux of life and has a taste for pitchforks. He knows that only the will to survive and the violence that destroys living beings matter, for it is a key operating mechanism. Taxonomic limits and rules don't apply anymore, and investment must continue without any support. Hence we will talk about the concept of menefreghismo as a cathexis based on a lack of cathexis-a libidinal investment that disavows the libidinal itself-as a social device on a mass scale, a kind of careless attitude, a productive way for fascism to inscribe itself in a positive affirmation of a perennial living death. Remarkably close to the neoliberal dictum, this is fascism's true postideological meaning: a destructuring force that proclaims to be beyond structures.
This form of thought manifests itself through ruptures, splits in continuity that nowadays a certain current of postmodern thought has come to essentialize as positive in themselves. Our attempt here is to historicize them, understanding the specific conditions in which these differences were valorized, in other words, how "the entry of forces; their eruption, the leap from the wings to center stage, each in its youthful strength" may be directed by capitalism in its many variants. 19 Furio Jesi and Difference The turn to life in its wild, untamed form also has to do with origin in terms of difference. In a series of works on the evolution of reactionary thought in the context of European culture, most importantly in Cultura di destra (Right-Wing Culture) (1979) and Bachofen (written in 1973 but unpublished until recently), cultural theorist Furio Jesi has shown that at the core of reaction there rests a passion for difference that is completely coherent with its dream of homogeneity. The cult of the past, in other words, is generated precisely on the basis of a desire for difference. 20 This point is crucial to my perspective, but in the pages that follow I will only be able to merely touch on it. Because of the relevance of Jesi's discussion of difference, I would like to take the time to reason about it for a moment. Temporal difference is valuable for the conservative not only because the past traces its legitimation via legacy or symbolic inheritance for the present but also because, as Jesi maintains, "only difference in time can amount to an effective breaking point in a model of history based on a unitary continuum." 21 Yet it is precisely within the crisis of modern Western culture that rupture undergoes a process of absolutization, of intensification, and thus emerges as difference qua noncontemporaneity. For reactionary thought this rift becomes productive not because, as is customary in the narratives of the left, it announces a negation of the present order but rather because it presents itself as a treasure of symbolic wisdom that can be mined and put to use. It follows that for reactionaries antiquity becomes a kind of spiritual luxury whose "principal characteristic is 'profaneness,' i.e., the accessibility of their materialistic objectives which they cloak in the rhetoric of the sacred or spiritual." 22 This is a common procedure in European culture: think of the importance of ancient Greece for German Romanticism, or of the Classic World in general for the Renaissance. But rather than ensuring continuity alone, the past can also be manipulated, and its difference can be used as a breaking point in the present. Hence the common action that a community performs when referring to a primordial ancestor may serve the purpose of institutionalizing a lineage that incorporates difference. This is the point in which, as it "implies an essential affinity that transcends time," a community constitutes itself as "the defense of a homogeneous group against its chief threat: the foreign," or the extraneous. 23 This operation may happen following two separate approaches to difference. The first one is typical of the occultist group with its ancient wisdom and the rites it inherits from past mystery cults. For these sects the secret "coincides with the category of difference that is temporal difference" and thus embodies "value" par excellence because it represents the link with past elites-a link that is also a point of discontinuity because it is unreachable to the noninitiated and because it does not belong to the present. 24 The other option available is that of the primitive. In effect, European society could have found difference qua the foreign in the savage were it not for the fact that the savage could not become the embodiment of value because his difference was not temporal. Primitives lived at the same time but also at the margin of modern civilizations, so they were different only "because of their human quality" and thus could not "own the secret" of which the group was the sole custodian. 25 With the notion of the selvaggio (the savage), the line of thought that we seek to study builds on this second option and simultaneously separates itself from the common trend in European culture precisely in attributing value to the other-or better, the construction of the savage as other-based on its difference. For Strapaese the savage was not the pacific Rousseauean man but his elemental, fearless counterpart. Their approach to difference is therefore closer to the idea of the primitives as radical alterity put forth by eighteenth-century European anthropology. Jesi argues that the latter generally perceived in the "savages an intellectual activity so radically different from that of the civilized that it demonstrated the actual noncontemporaneity between savages and civilized." 26 Strapaese sought to incorporate exactly this differential quality. We can reasonably state that the revolutionary element of Strapaese also rests on the mobilization of this type of difference. Accordingly, the savage comes to represent that figure that integrates both temporal and human difference. It thus conveys a pride generated from distinction that turns into a superior value, one that is immediately available for whoever joins the fascist militia. In this case, fascism generalizes difference in a way that breaks the boundaries established by the occultist logic and offers it for consumption to a larger set of people, consequently also setting forth a solution to the longstanding problem of Italy: the unity of its populations.
But difference is again connected to sexual difference. This is a conclusion that I believe Jesi too draws when studying the figure of Johann Jakob Bachofen. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the subtlety of Jesi's inquiry into Bachofen. Here it is enough to say that when delineating the right-wing reception of his work-especially his masterpiece Das Mutterrecht (Matriarchy) (1861) 27 -by philosophers such as Ludwig Klages, Alfred Schuler, and Edgar Dacqué, Jesi stresses the recuperation and incorporation of the feminine principle as the earthly and dark into the aerial and luminous paternal order. As Jesi argues, "the Right of the Bachofen Renaissance takes on the task of preserving the relationship between earth and sky, moon and sun, darkness and light," in totalitarian and absolutist terms. 28 Again this move represents a moment of violation of bourgeois conventions, the bold gesture that scandalously looks beneath its appearances and seemingly undermines bourgeois futility by engaging with the interdicted dimension of life.
Preface xviii This set of mechanisms is what I seek to explore in the first four chapters as I investigate works by Giovanni Papini, precursor and founder of Strapaese, and other important contributors such as Mino Maccari, Romano Bilenchi, and Curzio Malaparte. The last chapter represents instead a critical counterpoint to the incorporation of origin that I discussed so far. Painter, novelist, and journalist Carlo Levi demonstrates that an alternative reflection that took up the issue of life was also possible. His perspective offers a different interpretation of vitalism that understands mortality without turning it into a technology of oppression. This sort of ecology of the other produces a form of materialism that within the limits of the Western culture crisis, gestures toward the feminine as a structural dimension of origin without incorporating it into a totalitarian apparatus.
